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The Independence day announcement by the Prime Minister Narendra Modi on the
creation of the post of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) would be received with mixed feelings,
especially by old fogies like me. Enough banter has gone on amongst the services about
the wisdom of such a post, Indian Air Force (IAF) having been the main opponent, for
reasons of concerns about the marginalization of airpower capability whilst being put
“under command” by a non-expert another service boss. But now that we appear to be in
a fait accompli situation here, the committee apparently being tasked to operationalize
the proposal needs to look at the requirements sensibly to put in place an optimally
functioning architecture for the new organization.
Several important aspects come to mind. The overbearing one I feel is the need to evolve
our own type of organization, something that gels with our strategic and geopolitical
milieu, without blindly copying existing formats in other nations, specifically such as, the
US, Israel, China, UK or even Pakistan. The delay in bringing in a CDS for single-point
military advice to the government, despite the Kargil Committee recommendation for it,
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was mainly on account of ingrained insecurity in the minds of the politician and the
bureaucrat regarding an all-powerful CDS. This feeling is unlikely to go away soon and
would dictate the inter se status of the CDS …whether he would be a “first among equals”
four-star or a five-star entity with Field Marshal, Admiral of the Fleet or Marshal of the Air
Force rank. Knowing the prevailing mindset in the establishment it is my take that the
earlier option is likely to be exercised. So we could see a four-star CDS with seniority
above the service chiefs. His ambit of responsibility would include nuclear aspects, 
manning, procurement, doctrine and training, and perhaps international cooperation.
The operational tasks of orchestrating the war effort of each service would devolve with
the service chiefs themselves.
One of the arguments against bringing in a CDS post haste was the fact that turf battles
were rife amongst the three services and that we were not yet “mature” enough to
prosecute an integrated “maroon” warfighting philosophy. But perhaps after the last
seventeen odd years of having had a Chief of Integrated Defence Staff in place, maybe
some learning would have accrued in this context. Assuming that the three services
would quickly enough learn the ropes of jointry in a CDS format, the real issue would be
to integrate the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and Defence Research and Development
Organisation (DRDO) into the edifice. There are going to be lots of challenges in reporting
chain, career profiles, etc especially for civilian officers placed under the CDS. The Indian
Administrative Service (IAS) lobby has already voiced concern about civilian cadres being
brought under the CDS. The status of the Defence Secretary apropos the CDS is
something that needs careful engineering. Both would of course report to the Raksha
Mantri, but a five star CDS would tend to be higher in the warrant of precedence. How
the government handles this remains to be seen. More so an option for the “first among
equals” route!
Another vital requirement is to plan for officers and other ranks from the three services
to undergo meaningful regular “maroon” assignments up to their career advancement.
These tenures would have to be made mandatory for career progression. Army’s
experiment with line and staff appointments would need to be dovetailed into joint
assignments.
Concepts such as Theatre Command should not be tinkered with now. India’s strategic
and historic international postures do not lend themselves to theaterisation. Perhaps the
idea could be revisited after a decade of the CDS being in place. All three services have
inherently varying concepts, horizons, and operational doctrines and to integrate them
under a CDS would not be easy. Hence, the importance of valid operational doctrines and
the willingness amongst all ranks to adapt to the new operational culture.
About the Author:
2/3
Group Captain (Retd.) Murli Menon served in Indian Air
Force for 32 years, transiting its tactical, operational, strategic
and conceptual appointment spectra with credit. He was
India’s Air Advisor to Indian High Commission at Islamabad,
Pakistan (2000-2004). In his second avatar, he served for 8
years with India’s Cabinet Secretariat, including a stint as
Consular at Ankara, Turkey from 2008-2011.
He was one of the pioneers in the IAF’s Doctrine Think Tank –
“Air War Strategy Cell” that produced India’s first Air Power
Doctrine, the IAP 2000 in 1995. His interests include strategic
studies and post-retirement, he contributes to various think-tanks based out of New
Delhi, India. 
Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do
not necessarily reflect the views of IndraStra Global.
3/3
